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SENECA'S LETTERS TO LUCILLIUS

EDMUND LEITES

In a n i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t , S e n e c a is t h e f i r s t m o d e r n
philosopher. He affirms that he pleases himself only inasmuch as
he is morally worthy and that he values himself just because it is
himself. No justification of his self-love is needed. Every m a n
loves himself and Seneca is no exception. Obviously, neither
attitude is original to Seneca. What is distinctively m o d e r n is that
he stands behind both, although they are (in his experience)
clearly contradictory. They wouldn't be if the self which Seneca
loved (just because it was his) was n o n e other than his capacity to
recognize and live by universally valid moral values. He loves
himself, however, in all his particularity, even down to just how
warm or cold he likes to be (Letter 67).
Isn't Seneca known as the exponent of a Stoic ethic? Aren't the
charming stories about his personal foibles no more than rhetorical and pedagogical devices to charm the reader through his
admission that, like the reader, he is h u m a n — a n d isn't this meant
to be preparation for the sterner Stoicism which Seneca never
ceases to advocate? This customary reading cannot account for
the intensity of the humanity present in Seneca's Letters, an altogether new thing in the history of ancient philosophy. He
provides more than ' h u m a n interest' t h r o u g h the details of his
personal life, which he acknowledges do not always fulfill the
Stoic ethic. They are an expression of his love for himself in all his
diversity. In this matter, Montaigne was to be the best reader of
Seneca.
T h e means by which Seneca communicates his double commitment is subtle: not by the affirmation of opposing propositions, but by letters which (both singly and as an ensemble) move
back and forth between the prepositional assertion of Stoic morality and the assertion of his particular self t h r o u g h the open,
intense, and convincing expression of his own feelings. T h e success of his expression d e p e n d s upon his power as a writer: he is
the master—and sometimes, it would appear, the inventor—of a
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remarkable array of literary devices that make his emotions live
on the page—including the skillful use of a b r u p t and startling
changes of mood, as in his treatment of death. His belief that one
has no good reason to fear death is hardly original. Seneca himself makes f u n of its banality—he imagines his reader saying
"Decanta in omnibus scholis fabulae istae sunt; iam mihi, cum ad
c o n t e m n e n d a m m o r t e m ventum fuerit, Catonem narrabis" (Letter 24). This sympathetic portrayal of the reader's irritation
doesn't prevent him f r o m retelling, once again, Cato's last moments. ("Quidni ego n a r r e m ultima ilia nocte Platonis librum
legentem posito ad caput gladio?") After Cato's story, Seneca
retells Scipio's; pages follow in which the counsel against the fear
of death is expressed in many different ways. T h e concluding
p a r a g r a p h of the letter, however, involves an a b r u p t change of
tone: it is an anguished expression of Seneca's hatred of life:
"Quousque eadem? . . . Diem nox premit, dies noctem, aestas in
a u t u m n u m desinit, a u t u m n o hiemps instat, quae vere conpescitur; omnia sic transeunt ut reverantur. Nihil novi facio, nihil
novi video, fit aliquando et huius rei nausia."
T h e r e are many voices in these letters. Seneca is generous with
himself in giving so many of them expression. His belief in himself in all his variety is expressed t h r o u g h the very language of the
letters themselves: just as his love of the Stoic commitment to
constancy is conveyed by his tendency toward a steady and stable
tone, so his prose, which is o f t e n like the glittering sea, affirms his
love of himself in all his changeability.
Seneca's m o d e r n and (for his time) novel sense of self is, to
some extent, the result of a new idea of the chief psychic task
confronting each and every h u m a n being: he has t r a n s f o r m e d
the Platonic d e m a n d for self-mastery into the m o d e r n task of
self-possession. In Hesiod's Theogony, the elements that move all
things (including h u m a n s ) were divine forces that flowed
t h r o u g h o u t the world. T h e y moved a r o u n d h u m a n s and t h r o u g h
them, but they did not belong to them. Plato's sense of the cosmic
powers that activated all n a t u r e was not significantly different. As
for Hesiod, Plato's eros is not an expression of the self, but a cosmic
force that is outside of m a n as well as in him. T h e same is clearly
true of reason, which is no expression of the self, but a power
which shapes the world as a whole.
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Upholding this classical vision of the energies that motivate
humanity, Plato fashioned a congruent idea of the chief psychic
task of humanity: it was master of the forces that were at work
within one's psyche. Mastery does not imply possession, n o r the
ambition to possess. Plato did not think that any h u m a n being
could ever make the force of eros belong to him. T h a t would be
nonsense. It was a cosmic force, which could easily take a man
over and make him crazy. Humanity's task was to channel eros
toward its p r o p e r object. O n e could be master of forces one could
not own. For some reason, the body and its desire must be mastered, not possessed. It, too, was alien and could not be otherwise.
Even the rationality and morality which gave one the power to
j u d g e and master eros and the body were cosmic energies which
one could make use of, but could not make one's own.
For Seneca to own oneself is the task of one's life. "Qui se habet,
nihil perdidet. Sed quoto cuique habere contingit?" (Letter 42).
O n first examination, his idea of self-possession as a psychic task is
baffling because, in his experience, all that move us is us and
comes f r o m us. Cosmic forces no longer course t h r o u g h o u r
being. Even o u r rationality belongs to us. We own it. "De tuo
gaude. Quid est autem hoc 'de tuo'? T e ipso et tui optima parte"
(Letter 23). If everything that moves us belongs to us, how could
there be a problem about self-possession? It would seem as if we
could not avoid it. T h e matter becomes clearer when one recognizes that self-possession implies the existence of a self and that
even if all o u r motives are ours, this does not guarantee the
possession of a self. Only when the diversity of o u r motives are
given a coherence and integrity, only when something makes that
diversity, even in its diversity, one, is there a self. And when there
is a self, then one has a self.
T h e r e are, for Seneca, two quite different modes of achieving
self-possession. With respect to his love for himself in all his
particularity, he achieves unity t h r o u g h the organized expression
by aesthetic means of all that he is. Montaigne wrote for himself,
a n d Seneca does as well. He writes to his correspondent Lucillius,
he writes to us, and he writes to himself. "Mecum . . . loquor"
(Letter 10). He dares trust himself with the creation of himself.
Although the aesthetic f o r m of self-possession that Seneca
achieves d e p e n d s u p o n the resources of art, such as the juxtaposi-
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tion of moods, it is not 'literary,' if that is taken to mean 'fictional.'
T h e unity achieved is a real unity, not only one that exists on the
page or in the words of the speaker. It is experienced by its
creator—and properly so—as expressing who he really is. Art is
essential to this form of self-possession.
From the perspective of morality, Seneca seeks self-possession
t h r o u g h the achievement of a unity created by constancy. All that
he does, feels, thinks and says will be the expression of one and
the same steady moral purpose, which he believes to be universally valid. This would achieve more than self-mastery or the rule
of conscience, because what he will create, when successful, is a
morally expressive unity: "Maximum hoc est et officium sapientiae et indicium, ut verbis opera concordent, ut ipse ubique par
sibi idemque sit" (Letter 20; also see Letter 35).
Seneca is a Stoic and he is more than that. For the first time in
the history of Western philosophy, aesthetic unity, the form
necessary for self-possession in one's difference and particularity,
is affirmed alongside (and in obvious tension with) the equally
sincere call for moral self-possession, a unity f o r m e d with what
Seneca believes to be a universally valid body of truths. Both forms
of self-possession are necessary for Seneca. Even if it were possible to achieve, once and for all, self-possession t h r o u g h moral
unity, it would still be the case that in each and every h u m a n , more
than moral purpose would be present. Desire may be shaped to
express moral ends, but it cannot in all respects be identical with
them. Aesthetic unity will always be necessary for possession of
oneself in one's difference f r o m oneself. On almost every page of
his Letters Seneca brought this truth to life.
Queens College, City University of New York

Biographical Note
T h e life of Seneca is best approached through the account of
Tacitus (in the Annals), who took great care to be fair to a man who
was not only an exceptional philosopher, but (for a time) exceptionally wealthy and exceptionally powerful. Suetonius (in the
Lives of the Caesars) and later, Dio Cassius (writing in the third
century), were much less sympathetic, making much of common
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criticism that there was a d e e p conflict between Seneca's life and
his philosophy. I believe this view to be largely mistaken, since it
depends on the belief that Seneca was no more than a Stoic,
whereas I believe he was a good deal more than that. He expressed, through the complexity of his prose, counter-Stoic doctrines at the same time that he promoted in straightforwardly
prepositional form, conventional Stoicism. Today's treatments of
Seneca, although usually judicious, characteristically lack a passionate feeling for their subject, tending to make their treatments
of the man rather antiquarian. Still, the references they supply
are useful. See Miriam T . Griffin, Seneca; A Philosopher in Politics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976) and G. M. Ross, "Seneca's Philosophical Influence" in Seneca, edited by C.D.N. Costa (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 116-65.
A more philosophically profitable way of approaching Seneca
would be to read those authors who have grasped the complex
and richly contradictory n a t u r e of his Letters. Montaigne did, as
did Ralph Waldo Emerson. An u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Seneca is not,
however, so much to be gained by paying heed to their comments
on Seneca (as in Montaigne's Essays, I,xxvi ("De l'instruction des
enfans") and II,x ("Des livres"), but by the development of an
overall sense of the similar strategies of thought and expression.
Nonetheless, there is one book which, while not focussing specifically on Seneca, is vitally necessary for an understanding of the
psychic and philosophical challenges Seneca faced, and that is:
Michael Foucault, Le souci de soi (Histoire de la sexualite, 3), Paris,
Gallimard, 1984.
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